Ukrainian artillerymen fire a M777 howitzer towards Russian positions.
It is no secret the artillery fight for Ukraine has devolved into a battle for mass. The West, hoping to pump at least 200,000 155mm rounds a month into the Ukraine fight, is reaching into old stockpiles and even exploring the idea of refurbishing expired shells. These are all viable stopgaps, but, as the West’s ammunition production infrastructure struggles to scale up in 2024, the artisanal, hand-crafted aspects of post-Cold War artillery manufacturing merits some tough scrutiny.
Production is key.
America is set to produce at least 100,000 155mm shells a month by 2025, leaving Europe with the task to boost domestic production of 155mm shells by 150% over the course of 2024.
That is a heavy lift. To beat Russia in the production fight, the West has an obligation to explore every avenue to speed shells to the front. And while raiding old stockpiles and refurbishing expired munitions may offer some relief to Kyiv’s shell-hunger, Ukraine’s allies can do more to speed production by scrubbing their artillery production processes of un-needed and un-necessary requirements.
Excessive requirements are a big problem. To eke the maximum safety, shelf-life, and performance out of each and every shell, Western artillery ammunition is over-engineered—and then, on top of already daunting engineering requirements, the shells are subjected to an array of boutique national requirements.
Having each Western shell lovingly crafted to the exacting tolerances of a Formula 1 race-car engine offers measurable benefit. In ideal circumstances, Allied artillery systems outrange, outfire and hit harder than equivalent Russian systems. But conditions are no longer as ideal.
Any benefit from the West’s exquisite ammunition machining requirements and other time-consuming ammo production steps are likely offset by the degraded field conditions of an actual wartime environment.
Put another way, precision ammunition machining doesn’t make much difference when the shell goes up an overused gun barrel that, in peacetime, would have long been consigned to the scrapheap thousands of shells ago.
This isn’t to say that precision weapons aren’t needed, but a rough-and-ready “deployable” shell—just like the rough and ready M-109 self-propelled gun—is perfectly fine for repulsing Russian human wave attacks. Precision aiming is less of a concern when Ukraine fighters just want to keep hungry and cold Russian conscripts heads-down in their trenches.
Western ammunition is also designed with long-term storage in mind. With a big conventional war long being pretty much an “unthinkable” thing for Europe, frequent artillery employment was secondary to the West’s pursuit of long-term ammunition stability. Long-term ammunition reliability and easy decommissioning after lengthy storage have dominated Western shell requirements.
These peacetime priorities were the correct things for unchallenged armies to pursue. A long-lasting, stable and easy-to-decommission ammunition stockpile is a great thing, but when newly-produced shells are arriving at the front and used within days, some safety and storage features—if they make production more time-consuming or more costly—can be jettisoned.
Speeding ammo production or rapid design changes to advance lethality may not sit well with rear area warrior bureaucrats. In sclerotic procurement systems, change only comes after years of unnecessary study, debate and gamesmanship. Put bluntly, it will take some ruthless leadership to identify and cut requirements that, in the heat of battle, are no longer relevant.
Cherished rice bowls will break. Old, longstanding methods may go away. But, right now, the overarching priority—at least for general purpose artillery ammunition—is lower price and greater speed.
Anything less helps Russia.
