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Stages on Life's Way
Stages on Life's Way, the sequel to Either/Or, is an intensely poetic example of Kierkegaard's vision of the three stages, or spheres, of existence: the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. With characteristic love for mystification, he presents the work as a bundle of documents fallen by chance into the hands of "Hilarius Bookbinder, " who prepared them for printing. The book begins with a banquet scene patterned on Plato's Symposium. (George Brandes maintained that "one must recognize with amazement that it holds its own in this comparison.") Next is a discourse by "Judge William" in praise of marriage "in answer to objections." The remainder of the volume, almost two-thirds of the whole, is the diary of a young man, discovered by "Frater Taciturnus, " who was deeply in love but felt compelled to break his engagement. The work closes with a letter to the reader from Taciturnus on the three "existence-spheres" represented by the three parts of the book. Stages on Life's Way not only repeats themes, characters, and pseudonymous authors of the earlier works but also goes beyond them and points to further development of central ideas in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
808 pages, Paperback
First published April 30, 1845
About the author
Søren Kierkegaard
1,003 books5,516 followersSøren Aabye Kierkegaard was a prolific 19th century Danish philosopher and theologian. Kierkegaard strongly criticised both the Hegelianism of his time and what he saw as the empty formalities of the Church of Denmark. Much of his work deals with religious themes such as faith in God, the institution of the Christian Church, Christian ethics and theology, and the emotions and feelings of individuals when faced with life choices. His early work was written under various pseudonyms who present their own distinctive viewpoints in a complex dialogue.
Kierkegaard left the task of discovering the meaning of his works to the reader, because "the task must be made difficult, for only the difficult inspires the noble-hearted". Scholars have interpreted Kierkegaard variously as an existentialist, neo-orthodoxist, postmodernist, humanist, and individualist.
Crossing the boundaries of philosophy, theology, psychology, and literature, he is an influential figure in contemporary thought.
Kierkegaard left the task of discovering the meaning of his works to the reader, because "the task must be made difficult, for only the difficult inspires the noble-hearted". Scholars have interpreted Kierkegaard variously as an existentialist, neo-orthodoxist, postmodernist, humanist, and individualist.
Crossing the boundaries of philosophy, theology, psychology, and literature, he is an influential figure in contemporary thought.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
October 8, 2019
In his “Letter to the Reader” (pgs 398-494), Kierkegaard provides some insightful comments and analysis on the differences between the “tragic” and the “comic” in literature (or what he calls the “imaginary construction”), which is useful for any serious writer. One of the first and major distinctions between the tragic and the comic is how the tragic needs the historical far more than the comic does.
“It is by far the common practice to utilize the historical and with considerable reservation to understand the Aristotelian dictum that the poet is a greater philosopher than the historian because he shows how it ought to be, not how it is. The comic poet, however, does not need a historical foothold such as this. He may give his characters whatever he wants it, if only the comic ideality is there so there is sure to be laughter” (p 437).
To further illustrate his point, Kierkegaard uses the two lovers in “Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” as an example to explain more about the tragic and the comic in his imaginary construction.
“Now to my imaginary construction. I have placed together two heterogeneous individualities, one male and one female. Him I have kept in the power of spirit in the direction of the religious; her I have kept in esthetic categories. As soon as I posit a point of unity there can be plenty of misunderstanding. This point of unity is that they are united in loving each other… The conjunction in this misunderstanding is that they love each other, but in their heterogeneity this passion must express itself in essentially different ways, and thus the misunderstanding must not come between them from outside but develops in the relationship itself that exists between them. The tragic is that two lovers do not understand each other; the comic is that two who do not understand each other love each other” (pgs 420-421).
“This is how I have designed the imaginary construction—simultaneously comic and tragic” (p 430).
Also in “Letter to the Reader,” Kierkegaard discusses various aspects of the “esthetic hero,” which is still applicable and visible in contemporary literature almost two hundred years later.
“The esthetic hero, excelling by his quantitative difference, must possess within himself the conditions for being victorious, must be healthy, strong, etc.; then the difficulties come from the outside” (p 458).
In simple speak: “The esthetic hero must have his opposition outside himself, not in himself” (p 407).
Elaborating on the idea of the esthetic hero overcoming his/her external challenges, Kierkegaard defines for the writer-reader what is meant by an “esthetic outcome” for the esthetic hero and how that compares to a “religious outcome.”
“The esthetic outcome is in the external, and the external is the guarantee that the outcome is there; we see that the hero has triumphed, has conquered the country, and now we are finished. The religious outcome, indifferent toward the external, is assured only in the internal, that is, in faith. Indifferent toward the externality, which the esthetic needs (there must be great men, great subject matter, great events; so it becomes comic if there are small folk or petty cash), the religious is commensurate with the greatest man who has ever lived and with the most wretched, and equally commensurate, commensurate with the prosperity of nations and with a farthing, and equally commensurate. The religious is simply and solely qualitatively dialectic and disdains quantity, in which esthetic has its task” (pgs 442-443).
In further plain speak: “The esthetic hero is great by conquering, the religious hero by suffering” (p 454).
On “the ethical,” Kierkegaard further explores a deeper question in his imaginary construction “Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” and how the ethical can be connected to the religious.
“The ethical asks only about guilty or not guilty, is itself man enough to be a match for men, has no need for anything external and visible, to say nothing of something as ambiguously dialectical as fate and chance or the tangibility of some verdict document. The ethical is proud and declares: When I have judged, then nothing more is needed. This means that the ethical wants to be separated from the esthetic and the externality that is the latter’s imperfection; it desires to enter into a more glorious alliance, and this is with the religious” (p 442).
Not stopping with the religious connections to the ethical or to the esthetic hero, Kierkegaard makes strong arguments on how the object of faith can still be relevant today by explaining the act of belief. What one must also keep in mind is Kierkegaard’s understanding and use of the terms “actuality” and “ideality” (see page 426 for more details), which makes for an enlightening duplexity.
“There is nothing, therefore, more foolish in the religious sphere than to hear the commonsensical question that asks when something is being taught: Now, did it actually happen this way, for if it did one would believe it. Whether it actually happened this way, whether it is as ideal as it is represented, can be tested only by ideality, but one cannot have it historically bottled.
“I have been made aware of this by producing the story of suffering I have carried out as an imaginary construction. Alas, if I were a famous author, then a reading public that is energetic about believing, indefatigably energetic, would be distressed, for it would worry about the book and ask: But did it actually happen—for if so we will surely believe it. What is it the reading public wants to believe? That it actually happened. Well, one does not get anywhere along that road” (pgs 439-440).
Taking these concepts of actuality and ideality and moving away from literature and closer to human spirituality, Kierkegaard continues to explain the duality:
“It is spirit to ask about two things: (1) Is what is being said possible? (2) Am I able to do it?
“But it is lack of spirit to ask about two things: (1) Did it actually happen? (2) Has my neighbor Christophersen done it; has he actually done it?
“And faith is the ideality that resolves an esse in its posse and then conversely draws the conclusion in passion. If the object of faith is the absurd, then it still is not the historical that is believed, but faith is the ideality that resolves an esse in a non posse and now wills to believe it” (p 440).
“If someone were to declare that swimming is lying on dry land and threshing around, everyone presumably would consider him mad. But believing is just like swimming, and instead of helping one ashore the speaker should help one out into the deep” (p 443).
“It is by far the common practice to utilize the historical and with considerable reservation to understand the Aristotelian dictum that the poet is a greater philosopher than the historian because he shows how it ought to be, not how it is. The comic poet, however, does not need a historical foothold such as this. He may give his characters whatever he wants it, if only the comic ideality is there so there is sure to be laughter” (p 437).
To further illustrate his point, Kierkegaard uses the two lovers in “Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” as an example to explain more about the tragic and the comic in his imaginary construction.
“Now to my imaginary construction. I have placed together two heterogeneous individualities, one male and one female. Him I have kept in the power of spirit in the direction of the religious; her I have kept in esthetic categories. As soon as I posit a point of unity there can be plenty of misunderstanding. This point of unity is that they are united in loving each other… The conjunction in this misunderstanding is that they love each other, but in their heterogeneity this passion must express itself in essentially different ways, and thus the misunderstanding must not come between them from outside but develops in the relationship itself that exists between them. The tragic is that two lovers do not understand each other; the comic is that two who do not understand each other love each other” (pgs 420-421).
“This is how I have designed the imaginary construction—simultaneously comic and tragic” (p 430).
Also in “Letter to the Reader,” Kierkegaard discusses various aspects of the “esthetic hero,” which is still applicable and visible in contemporary literature almost two hundred years later.
“The esthetic hero, excelling by his quantitative difference, must possess within himself the conditions for being victorious, must be healthy, strong, etc.; then the difficulties come from the outside” (p 458).
In simple speak: “The esthetic hero must have his opposition outside himself, not in himself” (p 407).
Elaborating on the idea of the esthetic hero overcoming his/her external challenges, Kierkegaard defines for the writer-reader what is meant by an “esthetic outcome” for the esthetic hero and how that compares to a “religious outcome.”
“The esthetic outcome is in the external, and the external is the guarantee that the outcome is there; we see that the hero has triumphed, has conquered the country, and now we are finished. The religious outcome, indifferent toward the external, is assured only in the internal, that is, in faith. Indifferent toward the externality, which the esthetic needs (there must be great men, great subject matter, great events; so it becomes comic if there are small folk or petty cash), the religious is commensurate with the greatest man who has ever lived and with the most wretched, and equally commensurate, commensurate with the prosperity of nations and with a farthing, and equally commensurate. The religious is simply and solely qualitatively dialectic and disdains quantity, in which esthetic has its task” (pgs 442-443).
In further plain speak: “The esthetic hero is great by conquering, the religious hero by suffering” (p 454).
On “the ethical,” Kierkegaard further explores a deeper question in his imaginary construction “Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” and how the ethical can be connected to the religious.
“The ethical asks only about guilty or not guilty, is itself man enough to be a match for men, has no need for anything external and visible, to say nothing of something as ambiguously dialectical as fate and chance or the tangibility of some verdict document. The ethical is proud and declares: When I have judged, then nothing more is needed. This means that the ethical wants to be separated from the esthetic and the externality that is the latter’s imperfection; it desires to enter into a more glorious alliance, and this is with the religious” (p 442).
Not stopping with the religious connections to the ethical or to the esthetic hero, Kierkegaard makes strong arguments on how the object of faith can still be relevant today by explaining the act of belief. What one must also keep in mind is Kierkegaard’s understanding and use of the terms “actuality” and “ideality” (see page 426 for more details), which makes for an enlightening duplexity.
“There is nothing, therefore, more foolish in the religious sphere than to hear the commonsensical question that asks when something is being taught: Now, did it actually happen this way, for if it did one would believe it. Whether it actually happened this way, whether it is as ideal as it is represented, can be tested only by ideality, but one cannot have it historically bottled.
“I have been made aware of this by producing the story of suffering I have carried out as an imaginary construction. Alas, if I were a famous author, then a reading public that is energetic about believing, indefatigably energetic, would be distressed, for it would worry about the book and ask: But did it actually happen—for if so we will surely believe it. What is it the reading public wants to believe? That it actually happened. Well, one does not get anywhere along that road” (pgs 439-440).
Taking these concepts of actuality and ideality and moving away from literature and closer to human spirituality, Kierkegaard continues to explain the duality:
“It is spirit to ask about two things: (1) Is what is being said possible? (2) Am I able to do it?
“But it is lack of spirit to ask about two things: (1) Did it actually happen? (2) Has my neighbor Christophersen done it; has he actually done it?
“And faith is the ideality that resolves an esse in its posse and then conversely draws the conclusion in passion. If the object of faith is the absurd, then it still is not the historical that is believed, but faith is the ideality that resolves an esse in a non posse and now wills to believe it” (p 440).
“If someone were to declare that swimming is lying on dry land and threshing around, everyone presumably would consider him mad. But believing is just like swimming, and instead of helping one ashore the speaker should help one out into the deep” (p 443).
November 13, 2012
Though of course many of “Kierkegaard’s” works are synonymous, Stages on Life’s Way is an especially polyphonious mess. The text is introduced by one Hilarius Bookbinder, who purports to be published a gathered folio of papers left at his shop by an anonymous client. The folio itself consists of “In Vino Veritas,” a dialogue modeled on Plato’s Symposium and narrated by an unknown observer; “Reflections on Marriage” by Judge William (who also “wrote” the second part of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or); the diary of a troubled lover entitled “Guilty/Not Guilty?”, which is introduced by an unknown source who claims to have found it in a box at the bottom of a lake; and finally a “Letter to the Reader” by Frater Taciturnus. The letter is especially interesting. Taciturnus begins by claiming he is the author of “Guilty/Not Guilty?”, an “imaginary construction” he dreamt up to explore what happens when a “demonic” attempts to live a religious existence. By the end, however, the writer (still Taciturnus?) has begun to refer to Taciturnus in the third person, disavowing his explication of “Guilty/Not Guilty?” and dismissing him as a man who has been corrupted by his attempt to remain a purely neutral observer.
Every section is an exploration of the three “existence-spheres” posited by Kierkegaard: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The interlocutors in “In Vino Veritas” discuss various aesthetic conceptions of eros via various discourses about women. Judge William offers a paean to marriage as the ultimate “positive resolution” characterizing the ethical sphere. He also notes the possibility of an infinite negative resolution, but declares himself too weak for it as its contentlessness requires a never-ending repetition of the resolving. “Quidam” of “Guilty/Not Guilty?” pursues the demonic-religious as he attempts to break up with his earthly beloved through a thoroughgoing act of deception and feigned hatred. Taciturnus’s ultimate disavowal of his own (?) letter ends a lengthy consideration of whether the religious is something that can be directly communicated or can be anything other than the experience of an individual (though many caveats along the way suggest this is much more than a forwarding of pure autonomy and that the religious may imply something like a Levinasian infinite responsibility for the other that is never immediate).
I am interested in this text for two reasons: First, Kierkegaard’s fascination with Socrates (and not so much Plato, it’s worth noting). This manifests itself throughout the text. The various pseudonyms valorize the Socratic dialectic (in part as a method of discrediting Hegelian dialectic). Taciturnus forwards a very Socratic taxonomizing and rejection of “sophists” while at the same time classifying himself as a sophist (485-487). Positioned as he is at what is now seen in many histories of rhetoric as the beginning of the third sophistic, Kierkegaard-Taciturnus’s post-Hegelian redefinition of the sophists could be an interesting line of thinking to pursue and interrogate.
I am also fairly convinced that one could fruitfully read Kierkegaard as a proto-deconstructionist/third-sophistic rhetor(ician), similar to how Nietzsche has been positioned in recent decades. Many deconstructionists and poststructuralists reference Kierkegaard in passing (Nancy, de Man, Ronell, Butler), but few dwell on him at length. There are problems with such a project. Butler, for instance, argues that Kierkegaard saw all his works as taking place within a closed, controllable system of which he wanted to be the “author.” One could counter, however, that, all writers are only one book away from claiming some sort of grand unification for their works, and that in no way simply eliminates the rich self-deconstructions and proliferation of voices and “selves” in the rest of their corpus. And all Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms are distressingly sexist—one could retitle this book Misogynies on Life’s Way. The esthetes in “In Vino Veritas” discuss women as petty things and objects to be understood, Judge William is loyal but incredibly condescending to his wife, the “narrator” of “Guilty/Not Guilty?” claims to want what’s “best” for the “girl” to whom he’s betrothed but thinks he knows what’s best for her and has minimal faith in her ability to progress or do anything on her own. There are a lot of references to the “feminine” that mark it as passive or weak or emotional. But these are all also issues with Nietzsche that have not eliminated his significance in the rhetorical tradition, and—keeping in mind these are all pseudonyms writing in “stages”—there is an interesting moment where Taciturnus notes that the fiancee in “Guilty/Not Guilty?”, “like any other girl, had a possibility of becoming great” (456), thus attributing her passivity and emotional weakness as a singular aspect of her character rather than a generalized judgment or dismissal of women. All that said, after reading this book I’m realizing that this may have to be something I save for a future project rather than folding into a dissertation that’s ostensibly about something else.
Every section is an exploration of the three “existence-spheres” posited by Kierkegaard: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The interlocutors in “In Vino Veritas” discuss various aesthetic conceptions of eros via various discourses about women. Judge William offers a paean to marriage as the ultimate “positive resolution” characterizing the ethical sphere. He also notes the possibility of an infinite negative resolution, but declares himself too weak for it as its contentlessness requires a never-ending repetition of the resolving. “Quidam” of “Guilty/Not Guilty?” pursues the demonic-religious as he attempts to break up with his earthly beloved through a thoroughgoing act of deception and feigned hatred. Taciturnus’s ultimate disavowal of his own (?) letter ends a lengthy consideration of whether the religious is something that can be directly communicated or can be anything other than the experience of an individual (though many caveats along the way suggest this is much more than a forwarding of pure autonomy and that the religious may imply something like a Levinasian infinite responsibility for the other that is never immediate).
I am interested in this text for two reasons: First, Kierkegaard’s fascination with Socrates (and not so much Plato, it’s worth noting). This manifests itself throughout the text. The various pseudonyms valorize the Socratic dialectic (in part as a method of discrediting Hegelian dialectic). Taciturnus forwards a very Socratic taxonomizing and rejection of “sophists” while at the same time classifying himself as a sophist (485-487). Positioned as he is at what is now seen in many histories of rhetoric as the beginning of the third sophistic, Kierkegaard-Taciturnus’s post-Hegelian redefinition of the sophists could be an interesting line of thinking to pursue and interrogate.
I am also fairly convinced that one could fruitfully read Kierkegaard as a proto-deconstructionist/third-sophistic rhetor(ician), similar to how Nietzsche has been positioned in recent decades. Many deconstructionists and poststructuralists reference Kierkegaard in passing (Nancy, de Man, Ronell, Butler), but few dwell on him at length. There are problems with such a project. Butler, for instance, argues that Kierkegaard saw all his works as taking place within a closed, controllable system of which he wanted to be the “author.” One could counter, however, that, all writers are only one book away from claiming some sort of grand unification for their works, and that in no way simply eliminates the rich self-deconstructions and proliferation of voices and “selves” in the rest of their corpus. And all Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms are distressingly sexist—one could retitle this book Misogynies on Life’s Way. The esthetes in “In Vino Veritas” discuss women as petty things and objects to be understood, Judge William is loyal but incredibly condescending to his wife, the “narrator” of “Guilty/Not Guilty?” claims to want what’s “best” for the “girl” to whom he’s betrothed but thinks he knows what’s best for her and has minimal faith in her ability to progress or do anything on her own. There are a lot of references to the “feminine” that mark it as passive or weak or emotional. But these are all also issues with Nietzsche that have not eliminated his significance in the rhetorical tradition, and—keeping in mind these are all pseudonyms writing in “stages”—there is an interesting moment where Taciturnus notes that the fiancee in “Guilty/Not Guilty?”, “like any other girl, had a possibility of becoming great” (456), thus attributing her passivity and emotional weakness as a singular aspect of her character rather than a generalized judgment or dismissal of women. All that said, after reading this book I’m realizing that this may have to be something I save for a future project rather than folding into a dissertation that’s ostensibly about something else.
January 17, 2021
Lots of good stuff there, but could probably have cut, say, between one an two hundred pages with little to no loss. He’s a funny guy, though. Neurotic, obviously. If you were to meet him at a bar, do strike up a conversation, but make sure to have an excuse ready for leaving when he starts talking about his ex. It just goes on and on.
Read
September 22, 2015Some authors and great books have means of returning you to yourself; while others blaze new trails and cause seismic shifts to happen, which in turn create new vistas, never thought possible. And some authors can do both of these, occasionally simultaneously.
I return to great authors and great books for both of these reasons, and I've learned that, for my part, Kierkegaard has this later ambidextrous skill in spades. With many wonderful passages to choose from, I feel compelled to offer his concluding paragraph—which amusingly hints at some of the difficult treasures that had just preceded, while also acting as a litmus test that might draw potential readers in.
“Alas, alas, alas! How fortunate that there is no reader who reads all the way through, and if there were any, the harm from being allowed to shift for oneself* when it is the only thing he wishes, is, after all, like the punishment at the hand of the men of Molbo who threw the eel into the water.”
*shift for oneself = idiom; aka, fend for oneself.
I was recently asked who I thought most influenced Kierkegaard. It's a difficult question. The first person who came to mind was Shakespeare. The next person who came to mind was Socrates. And not just the Socrates we know from Plato – he's also influenced by the Socrates we know from myth. Kierkegaard is often right there with Socrates in pure irony—not at some point in the crowd, directing it at somebody or something, but entirely in front of, outside of, beyond the crowd of humanity yet wholly engendered from it and concerned with it. Which is a similar point of view from which Shakespeare writes. OSLT.
Dixi et liberavi cor meum
(I have spoken and delivered my heart.)
I return to great authors and great books for both of these reasons, and I've learned that, for my part, Kierkegaard has this later ambidextrous skill in spades. With many wonderful passages to choose from, I feel compelled to offer his concluding paragraph—which amusingly hints at some of the difficult treasures that had just preceded, while also acting as a litmus test that might draw potential readers in.
“Alas, alas, alas! How fortunate that there is no reader who reads all the way through, and if there were any, the harm from being allowed to shift for oneself* when it is the only thing he wishes, is, after all, like the punishment at the hand of the men of Molbo who threw the eel into the water.”
*shift for oneself = idiom; aka, fend for oneself.
I was recently asked who I thought most influenced Kierkegaard. It's a difficult question. The first person who came to mind was Shakespeare. The next person who came to mind was Socrates. And not just the Socrates we know from Plato – he's also influenced by the Socrates we know from myth. Kierkegaard is often right there with Socrates in pure irony—not at some point in the crowd, directing it at somebody or something, but entirely in front of, outside of, beyond the crowd of humanity yet wholly engendered from it and concerned with it. Which is a similar point of view from which Shakespeare writes. OSLT.
Dixi et liberavi cor meum
(I have spoken and delivered my heart.)
May 14, 2018
Either/Or laid out the esthetic and the ethical existences (in books 1 and 2 respectively), and this book that came along years later is supposed to be a sort of followup that spells out the third existence, the religious, alongside the others.
I definitely preferred this one over Either/Or (note: I have only read the first volume of Either/Or so far). This one is composed of a few smaller works: "In Vino Veritas", "Reflections on Marriage", "Guilty? Not Guilty?", "Letter to the Reader".
I found the last two to be the most illuminating. "Guilty? Not Guilty?" is almost the ethical version of the "Seducer's Diary" from Either/Or. It spells out very clearly why Kierkegaard himself couldn't marry: because he thought it would prevent him from entering the religious sphere of existence, which he needed to work out with his voluminous works. I really got the impression this was Kierkegaard working out and rationalizing why he broke off his engagement, and is perhaps also put out there for Regine herself to read. "Guilty? Not Guilty?" is way more believable and sensible than the crazy guy in Either/Or, and it's more believable that this is Kierkegaard's voice, not the demon he made himself out to be in the Seducer's Diary. (this also spells out clearly why he made himself out to be a demon in the first place, to be able to break off the marriage with Regine while still keeping her honorable in society's eyes).
"If she had won out, he would have been lost. Even if her lightheartedness, which, after all is a declining fund, had been capable of making him a happy married man, this was not what he was supposed to be. But of this he does not dream and merely feels his misery so deeply that he is incapable of being what everyone is capable of - being a married man." ("Letter to the Reader", pg 401 in original text)
"Letter to the Reader" is a helpful capstone to it all, and spells out things clearest of all. I left a quote from that section below, since it's helpful in illustrating what this book's all about.
Throughout we of course have a lot of humor (what Kierkegaard is famous for) scattered throughout, probably mostly concentrated in "In Vino Veritas", which is bound to offend some modern readers.
The whole production is very long, and by the end of the book, Kierkegaard's pseudonym pokes fun at himself, asking if he has any readers left at all at that point so late in the book.
Once again another great Hong translation, with more footnotes than you could ever read in your lifetime (about half the book is just footnotes and Kierkegaard drafts and journal entries). Laced with so many literary and of course Biblical references for anyone curious to delve further.
Later in the book there is a lot of references to depression and self-suffering, and how the religious sphere can help.
One more random note: there are some references here to what would become the confusing "self relating itself to itself" opening line of the Sickness Unto Death (the self contemplating itself), and it shows that the line isn't an accident and at least isn't 100% parody of confusing Hegel terminology. The quote in SUD is super-convoluted however, so I wouldn't be surprised if it was supposed to be a little bit tongue-in-cheek.
One quote to summarize the book:
"There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious... the ethical sphere is only a transition sphere, and therefore its highest expression is repentance as a negative action. The esthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the religious the sphere of fulfillment but, please note, not a fulfillment such as when one fills an alms box or a sack with gold, for repentance has specifically created a boundless space, and as a consequence the religious contradiction: simultaneously to be out on 70,000 fathoms of water and yet be joyful." ("Letter to the Reader, pg. 443 in original text)
I definitely preferred this one over Either/Or (note: I have only read the first volume of Either/Or so far). This one is composed of a few smaller works: "In Vino Veritas", "Reflections on Marriage", "Guilty? Not Guilty?", "Letter to the Reader".
I found the last two to be the most illuminating. "Guilty? Not Guilty?" is almost the ethical version of the "Seducer's Diary" from Either/Or. It spells out very clearly why Kierkegaard himself couldn't marry: because he thought it would prevent him from entering the religious sphere of existence, which he needed to work out with his voluminous works. I really got the impression this was Kierkegaard working out and rationalizing why he broke off his engagement, and is perhaps also put out there for Regine herself to read. "Guilty? Not Guilty?" is way more believable and sensible than the crazy guy in Either/Or, and it's more believable that this is Kierkegaard's voice, not the demon he made himself out to be in the Seducer's Diary. (this also spells out clearly why he made himself out to be a demon in the first place, to be able to break off the marriage with Regine while still keeping her honorable in society's eyes).
"If she had won out, he would have been lost. Even if her lightheartedness, which, after all is a declining fund, had been capable of making him a happy married man, this was not what he was supposed to be. But of this he does not dream and merely feels his misery so deeply that he is incapable of being what everyone is capable of - being a married man." ("Letter to the Reader", pg 401 in original text)
"Letter to the Reader" is a helpful capstone to it all, and spells out things clearest of all. I left a quote from that section below, since it's helpful in illustrating what this book's all about.
Throughout we of course have a lot of humor (what Kierkegaard is famous for) scattered throughout, probably mostly concentrated in "In Vino Veritas", which is bound to offend some modern readers.
The whole production is very long, and by the end of the book, Kierkegaard's pseudonym pokes fun at himself, asking if he has any readers left at all at that point so late in the book.
Once again another great Hong translation, with more footnotes than you could ever read in your lifetime (about half the book is just footnotes and Kierkegaard drafts and journal entries). Laced with so many literary and of course Biblical references for anyone curious to delve further.
Later in the book there is a lot of references to depression and self-suffering, and how the religious sphere can help.
One more random note: there are some references here to what would become the confusing "self relating itself to itself" opening line of the Sickness Unto Death (the self contemplating itself), and it shows that the line isn't an accident and at least isn't 100% parody of confusing Hegel terminology. The quote in SUD is super-convoluted however, so I wouldn't be surprised if it was supposed to be a little bit tongue-in-cheek.
One quote to summarize the book:
"There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious... the ethical sphere is only a transition sphere, and therefore its highest expression is repentance as a negative action. The esthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the religious the sphere of fulfillment but, please note, not a fulfillment such as when one fills an alms box or a sack with gold, for repentance has specifically created a boundless space, and as a consequence the religious contradiction: simultaneously to be out on 70,000 fathoms of water and yet be joyful." ("Letter to the Reader, pg. 443 in original text)
November 20, 2020
I re-read the initial English translation by Walter Lowrey published in the early 1940s. Simply because of changes in English style, always recommend reading SK in translations other than Lowrie if possible.
To me, this pseudonymous work by SK (published in 1845 along with THREE DISCOURSES — published under SK’s own name) is a showcase for his literary and imaginative presentation of his concern with the basic question of “the various styles of human existence.”
It has three main parts — each presenting, through a variety of pseudonymous voices, existence through the lens of: the poetical-aesthetic, the ethical-religious, and finally someone struggling to exist in complete “inwardness” as a religious self in the “God-relationship”
The first two sections (the aesthetic and the ethical) are basically shorter version of the 1843 book EITHER-OR. The first section is notable for the variety of pseudonymous speakers (many already appearing in SK’s pseudonymous works of 1843 and 1844).
The long final section (the strive for the religious) continues themes seen in the earlier works FEAR AND TREMBLING and REPETITION (compare the pseudonymous author of this section — FRATER TACITURNUS (brother silent) — with JOHANNES DE SILENTIO (John the silent — the pseudonymous author of FEAR AND TREMBLING).
If you are new to SK, this book will have more significance if you first read a good commentary on SK’s entire authorship and this book in particular.
To me, this pseudonymous work by SK (published in 1845 along with THREE DISCOURSES — published under SK’s own name) is a showcase for his literary and imaginative presentation of his concern with the basic question of “the various styles of human existence.”
It has three main parts — each presenting, through a variety of pseudonymous voices, existence through the lens of: the poetical-aesthetic, the ethical-religious, and finally someone struggling to exist in complete “inwardness” as a religious self in the “God-relationship”
The first two sections (the aesthetic and the ethical) are basically shorter version of the 1843 book EITHER-OR. The first section is notable for the variety of pseudonymous speakers (many already appearing in SK’s pseudonymous works of 1843 and 1844).
The long final section (the strive for the religious) continues themes seen in the earlier works FEAR AND TREMBLING and REPETITION (compare the pseudonymous author of this section — FRATER TACITURNUS (brother silent) — with JOHANNES DE SILENTIO (John the silent — the pseudonymous author of FEAR AND TREMBLING).
If you are new to SK, this book will have more significance if you first read a good commentary on SK’s entire authorship and this book in particular.
December 26, 2023
In some ways, this book is critical S.K, detailing the spiritual stages on life's way. The title is quite apt. In other ways, though, Stages can be skipped. At the heart of the matter is how much work the reader has to do, over the course of a long book, to understand what's happening and what's meant. No doubt this book is best read and studied in a class or some other group with a learned leader. Except for "In Vino Veritas" the reader will quickly lose interest and lose track of their critical eye without guidance.
I'd only recommend picking this one up if you're a dedicated S.K. reader. If you're not, and perhaps even if you are, I'd instead recommend finding a critical summary of it by some scholar.
I'd only recommend picking this one up if you're a dedicated S.K. reader. If you're not, and perhaps even if you are, I'd instead recommend finding a critical summary of it by some scholar.
November 24, 2017
Колкото повече чета Киркегор, толкова повече го заобичвам. Прекрасен и вдъхновителен! Единствен в своята категория.
May 17, 2019
Por fin!!
August 3, 2023
Five stars for 'The Banquet'.
April 8, 2015
"...genom att observera stjärnorna och läsa i kaffesumpen i kraft av min skaldeblick och mina falkögon, gör följande makalösa förutsägelse veterlig, att av bokens fåtaliga läsare kommer två tredjedelar att stupa på halva vägen, vilket också kan uttryckas så här: de kommer att köra fast och kasta bort boken av leda."
LOL detta var träffande. Jag gjorde likadant, men i en sista ansats bläddrade jag fram, blev HÄNFÖRD av detta citat. Fortsatte att läsa. genialiskt
första delen av boken FILTRERAR bort ovärdiga läsare. slumpen tillät mig att också läsa den sista delen
LOL detta var träffande. Jag gjorde likadant, men i en sista ansats bläddrade jag fram, blev HÄNFÖRD av detta citat. Fortsatte att läsa. genialiskt
första delen av boken FILTRERAR bort ovärdiga läsare. slumpen tillät mig att också läsa den sista delen
March 7, 2014
This is hands down the most brilliant thing I've ever read.
March 13, 2015
Nästan obegriplig. MEN likvisst berikande, insiktsfull för en trevande ung man i livets begynnande skeende
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