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by:

Carrie Menendez
Failure Metallurgist
Stork Materials Testing & Inspection (SMT &1)
15062 Bolsa Chica
Huntington Beach, CA 92649 USA
www.storksmti.com

There are failure

must

1 st Case History:
Reverted Austenite
Category of Failure Mechanism in Survey:
Heat Treat Related Failures (2%)
A batch of stainless steel fasteners (Type 17-4 PH) was
submitted to SMT &1 for passivation, as is typical for this
material. The fastenerswere passivated in accordance with a
specification such as QQ-P-35, which specifies the solution
to be used (20% to 25% by volume ofHNOJ and 2.5% :i: 0.5%
by weight of Na2Cr207x 2H20) as well as the time and the
temperature of the passivation process (20 minutes at 120F
to 130F or 49C to 54OC)basedon the material.
After passivation it was noticed that the samples appeared
corroded or attacked, with a dull gray surface finish (as seen
in Figure 1) that felt slightly gritty to the touch. The failure
analysis group was asked to determine the cause of the problem. In this case, the fastener had not been in service, therefore the problem was limited to a manufacturing problem, a
heat treating problem or a passivation process problem.
A longitudinal metallographic cross section through one
of the "attacked" fastenerswas mounted in Bakelite and then
ground and polished to a metallurgical finish. An examination
of the cross section in the as-polished condition did not reveal any obvious anomalies that would account for the responseof the material to typical passivation procedures.However, in the etched condition, it was clear that the fastener had
been attacked or eaten in areasthat were metallurgicallydifferent than the bulk Type 17-4 PH stainlesssteel material. The
etched microstructure exhibited a distinct non-uniform white
Fastener Technology

Intemational/October

2003

other

than

fatigue,
hydrogen
embrittlement,
stress
corrosion
cracking
and overload
that

Recently the failure analysis departmentat SMT &1 in Huntington Beach created a brief survey of fastener failures analyzed by the group over a ten-year period and found that
there were four predominant failure mechanisms accounting
for 77% of the fastener failures analysis by SMT&I personnel. Thesepredominant failure mechanisms were categorized
as fatigue, hydrogen embrittlement, stresscorrosion cracking
and overload.
In general, most people working in the fastener industry
have experienced or dealt with one or more of these major
failure mechanisms and will sometimes elect not to perform a
full failure analysis because they are "familiar" with these
failure mechanisms or because the cost of the analysis exceeds the replacement costs of the fasteners.
However, there are numerousother failure mechanismsthat
are not as prevalent and may not appear as often in the fastener and precision formed parts manufacturing industry. This
article presents three such failure mechanisms encountered
by SMT&I failure analysis personnel.

26

mechanisms

be dealt with

by fastener

makers.

layer (as seen in Figure 2) along the surface of the fastener


that was found to be reverted austenite. The corrosion of this
white layer was visible in several areas of the examined fastener.
Past analyses performed at SMT &1 have found that reverted or retained austenite exhibits a much lower resistance
to corrosive-type attack than the surrounding martensitic structure. The presence of such a non-uniform layer of reverted
austenite is typically the result of nitrogen pick-up during
heat treatment of the fastener and is commonly associated
with a contaminated furnace atmosphere.

Fig. 2 -Reverted
austenite layer layer on
fastener (magnification SOX).

rd Case ffistory:
Segregation of Inclusions/Forging
Defect
Category of Failure Mechanism(s) in Survey:
Raw Material Defects (1%) and/or
Manufacturing Defects (8%)
Severalaluminum toe bolts were submitted to SMT &1 personnel to determine the causeof crack indications/bursts visible on the point end of the bolts (Figure 3) from two groups.
One of the submitted groups
of toe bolts did not exhibit
any obvious indications of
defects and was to be used
as a control or comparison
group of samples.Sectioning
one of the "bad" bolts resultedin the core material falling out of the threaded portion as though the threads
Fig. 3- Cracks & burst
were a sleeve or a shell (as visible on point end of bolts.
seenin Figure 4).

head. The inclusions and/or bursts were found to follow the


contour of the head, suggesting that the bursts were created
or accentuated during the forging process. In the transverse
orientation, the segregation of inclusions was distinctly visible surrounding the path of the bursts in the toe bolt material.
The toe bolts were reportedly made of AA 2024 material in
the T4 condition. But chemical analysis of the submitted bolts
revealed the material to be AA 6061. Tensile tests performed
on two of the samples containing no obvious indications of
cracksrevealedan averagetensile strengthof 47 ksi (324 MPa),
which is consistentwith AA 6061 in the T6 condition (45 ksi or
310 MPa). AA2024 in the T4 condition would typically exhibit
a tensile strength of approximately 68 ksi (469 MPa).
Aside from the variation in material and tensile strength
from the reported information or drawing information, the presence of such segregation of inclusions within the material
would be problematic. It could not be determined, however, if
the forging bursts were related to the variation in material
properties/impropermateriaJ. For instance, if a more severe
force is used to forge AA 2024 T 4 material than would be used
for AA 6061 T6, then it is conceivable that the bursts may not
have been present if the appropriate forging conditions were
used for the material actually used to make the bolts. However, the segregation of inclusions is not related to the forging of the bolts. Rather, it is associated with the wire or bar
stock used to make the fastener blanks. Therefore in this case,
two types offailure mechanisms contributed to the failures of
the toe bolts. These were raw material defects (inclusion segregation) and manufacturing defects (forging bursts).

3rd Case History:


Poor Grain Flow
Category of Failure Mechanism in Survey:
Fig. 4 -Bottom & side views
Manufacturing Defects (8%)
of core material (I) that fell
One failed hex bolt was submitted to SMT &1 to determine
out of the threaded portion (r)
of the bad bolt after sectioning. the cause of the failure. The fracture was located on the underside of the head as shown in Figure 6. Examination of the
mating fracture surfaces did not reveal any obvious evidence
Longitudinal and transverse cross sections through bad of a single point origin or pre-existing defect ( quench crack,
bolts were mounted in Bakelite and polished to a metallurgical lap, etc.) that would account for the failure of the hex bolt.
fmish. Examination of the samplesin the as-polishedand etched
A longitudinal cross section through the mating pieces of
conditions revealed clear evidence of a path of segregated the fractured bolt was mounted in Bakelite and polished to a
inclusions and/or bursts throughout the threaded section of metallurgical finish. Examinathe fasteners (as seen in Figure 5) as well as into the forged tion in the as-polished condition revealed no obvious evidence of foreign material or
other manufacturing anomalies such as laps or folds that
would account for the failure.
The sample was etched using a solution of3% Nital and
re-examined.
The etched sample revealed flow lines from the
heading operation extending
into the shank of the bolt,
which is typically considered
undesirable (see Figure 7 on
the next page). Further exami"
VC
C.'C
i';
nation of the etched cross
Fig. 6 -Fracture
located
Fig. 5Path of segregated inclusions & bursts throughout
on underside of head on
section revealed the heavily
threaded section of fastener (magnification
15X).
failed hex bolt.
deformed grain flow to be oriOctober 2003/Fastener

Technology

International

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