Nintendo's “Revolution” - MIT Sloan School of Management
Nintendo's “Revolution” - MIT Sloan School of Management
Nintendo's “Revolution” - MIT Sloan School of Management
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Nintendo’s <strong>“Revolution”</strong><br />
Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka<br />
11-124<br />
October 18, 2011<br />
Satoru Iwata, president <strong>of</strong> Nintendo Corporation (Nintendo), strode from the conference room with a<br />
smile on his face. It was late 2004, and he was tremendously excited with what his engineers had just<br />
demonstrated — a video game controller that was not a variation <strong>of</strong> the joystick, but rather a stubby<br />
rod that a gamer could manipulate with one hand. Not only did it enable the creation <strong>of</strong> games that<br />
mimicked real-world movements like throwing, hitting, or aiming, Iwata believed it could help open<br />
up video games to a vastly different audience than the boys and young men who traditionally bought<br />
video game consoles.<br />
Expanding the gaming industry’s customer base was key to Iwata’s vision <strong>of</strong> a next-generation<br />
console codenamed “Revolution.” The idea was to bring tens <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> new customers into the<br />
gaming realm, people who had never played video games before or saw them as mere toys. Iwata<br />
believed that a new take on gaming might even attract mothers — an influential household<br />
constituency, thanks to their influence over household spending 1 — through a combination <strong>of</strong><br />
hardware design, game-play, and price. What better way to attract them than through a controller that<br />
had a form factor similar to a TV remote control?<br />
But Iwata’s enthusiasm for the controller prototype was tempered by a number <strong>of</strong> real-world<br />
considerations. First, no other company had ever released such a controller. How would the<br />
marketplace react to such a vastly different model? Second, many <strong>of</strong> the technologies that were<br />
required to make the rod controller work — such as wireless positioning — might never operate<br />
perfectly outside <strong>of</strong> the lab, in people’s apartments and homes. Third, any new Nintendo controller<br />
1 American Express Everyday Spending Index, via Ashish Rajan, “Convenience Drives Cards,” CardTrak.com, March 13, 2000. Accessed via<br />
http://www.cardtrak.com/news/2000/03/13/convenience_drives_cards in June 2011.<br />
This case was prepared by Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, and Hiroaki Takaoka (<strong>Sloan</strong><br />
Fellows, Class <strong>of</strong> 2011).<br />
Copyright © 2011, Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, and Hiroaki Takaoka. This work is licensed<br />
under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy <strong>of</strong> this<br />
license visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite<br />
300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.
NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION”<br />
Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka<br />
had to be backwards compatible with games made for older Nintendo consoles like the GameCube,<br />
which used traditional two-handed controllers.<br />
Additionally, Iwata was very sensitive to the reaction <strong>of</strong> the gaming industry and the existing gaming<br />
population to a non-traditional product aimed at a non-traditional audience. Nintendo had a long<br />
history <strong>of</strong> video game success, epitomized by the popular Mario Bros. franchise invented by<br />
Nintendo’s game design guru Shigeru Miyamoto in the 1980s. However, the company’s last console,<br />
the GameCube, was unable to get sufficient traction after it was launched in 2001. In 2002, sales<br />
forecasts for the GameCube had been <strong>of</strong>f by 44% and the company had been forced to cut revenue<br />
targets by ¥100 billion. 2 Gamers much preferred Sony’s PlayStation 2 console and Micros<strong>of</strong>t’s Xbox<br />
console, 3 which were characterized by flashy graphics and hardcore fighting and sports titles. Iwata<br />
needed a home run to put Nintendo back on its feet. Could the Revolution’s radical hardware design<br />
help turn the company’s fortunes around?<br />
History <strong>of</strong> Video Games<br />
1960s-1970s<br />
Video games have been around since the early 1960s. In 1962 <strong>MIT</strong> students Steve Russell, Martin<br />
Graetz and Wayne Witaenem developed Spacewars, the first video game. Spacewars marked the first<br />
time that computer graphics were used in a game. It quickly gained popularity among hackers and<br />
computer geeks, 4 but never had a mainstream audience, owing to the fact that most people did not<br />
have computer access.<br />
In the late 1960s, Alan Kay developed the Dynabook, an early personal computer, which was targeted<br />
at children. The Dynabook concept set the stage for both the PC and computer game revolutions in<br />
the 1970s. 5 The first game console was the Magnavox Odyssey, developed by engineer Ralph Baer as<br />
a side project in 1972. 6 The following year, U.S.-based Atari launched a simple table tennis game<br />
called Pong in the United States, which could be hooked up to a TV set. 7 It was a hit. In 1977, the<br />
company released a more sophisticated game console, the Atari 2600, which let users load different<br />
games into the system using rectangular cartridges. It was an even bigger hit, selling more than 30<br />
million units. 8<br />
2 David Teather, “Nintendo in Sales,” The Guardian, March 8, 2003. Accessed from<br />
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2003/apr/08/business.onlinesupplement in December 2010.<br />
3 Ibid.<br />
4 <strong>MIT</strong> 150 Exhibition “Spacewar! Steve Russell, Martin Graetz, and Wayne Witaenem, 1961–1962.” Accessed from http://museum.mit.edu/150/25 in May<br />
2011.<br />
5 Pete Markiewicz, “Plyojump - Computer History.” Accessed from http://www.plyojump.com/classes/microcomputer_era.html in May 2011.<br />
6 Philip Likens, “Ralph Baer: The Magnavox Odyssey.” Accessed from http://dept<strong>of</strong>.com/?p=185 in May 2011.<br />
7 Pete Markiewicz, “Plyojump - Computer History - Computer and Console Games (1952-Present).” Accessed from<br />
http://www.plyojump.com/classes/computer_games.html in May 2011.<br />
8 Ge<strong>of</strong>f Edgers, “Q&A: A Talk with Nick Montfort: Atari and the Deep History <strong>of</strong> Video Games,” Boston Globe, March 8, 2009. Accessed from<br />
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/03/08/a_talk_with_nick_montfort/ in December 2010.<br />
October 18, 2011 2
NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION”<br />
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Japanese companies took notice. In 1977, Nintendo released a Pong knock<strong>of</strong>f called Color TV Game<br />
6 (“6” referred to the number <strong>of</strong> variations <strong>of</strong> the game that players could select). It sold more than 1<br />
million units. 9 In 1978, Taito launched an arcade game called Space Invaders. The game, designed by<br />
Tomohiro Nishikado, was one <strong>of</strong> the first video games to feature shooting, and helped expand the<br />
video game industry from a novelty to a global industry. 10 In 1980, Atari licensed the game from<br />
Taito, which greatly boosted the 2600 console’s sales and audience size.<br />
Global Expansion<br />
Atari’s business model — licensing titles, commissioning developers to write games, and developing<br />
other titles in-house — was not sustainable, especially as the 2600 console’s 1977-era technology<br />
became dated. As it faded in the early 1980s, Japanese companies took the lead in developing gaming<br />
hardware and s<strong>of</strong>tware for both mobile and console systems.<br />
In 1980, Nintendo launched “Game and Watch,” which was the first handheld game device inspired<br />
by an LCD calculator and digital watch. 11 Later in the decade, the company would release the Game<br />
Boy, which dominated the hand-held gaming market for years.<br />
Nintendo’s console foray was even more successful. It developed the Famicom (short for “Family<br />
Computer”) in Japan in 1983. Titles such as Mario Bros. and a console version <strong>of</strong> the arcade hit<br />
Donkey Kong made the Famicom hugely popular in Japan. In 1985, Nintendo released the Famicom<br />
worldwide as the Nintendo Entertainment System, or NES. 12 (See Exhibit 1.) The NES console had a<br />
different exterior casing than the Famicom’s, but the components inside were nearly identical. It was<br />
a runaway success, selling 62 million units worldwide. 13<br />
Key to Nintendo’s success was the company’s control over third-party s<strong>of</strong>tware developers. Nintendo<br />
encouraged third-party developers to create games for the wildly popular NES, as long as they agreed<br />
to produce no more than five games per year, and not produce titles for any other console system for<br />
two years. 14 Nintendo would manufacture approved titles on NES-compatible game cartridges and<br />
sell them back to developers, who would then market and distribute the games. The system<br />
encouraged the development <strong>of</strong> innovative new titles and more NES sales. By 1989, video games<br />
were a $3.4 billion market in the United States, and Nintendo claimed a 79% market share. 15<br />
9 Wikia Gaming, “Nintendo: Color TV Game 6.” Accessed from http://nintendo.wikia.com/wiki/Color_TV_Game_6 in June 2011.<br />
10 Tony Gray, “Hooked on Space Invaders,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September 9, 1980.<br />
11 Sally Solo, “The Best Toys Come in Square Packages,” United Press International/Times Daily, November 27, 1983.<br />
12 “Top 25 Video Game Consoles <strong>of</strong> All Time,.” IGN.com. Accessed from http://www.ign.com/top-25-consoles/ in December 2010.<br />
13 Ibid; Nintendo Co., Ltd.: Consolidated Sales Transition by Region. Accessed from http://www.nintendo.co.jp/ir/en/library/historical_data/index.html in June<br />
2011.<br />
14 J. Rader, “Background: Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo <strong>of</strong> America Inc. U.S. Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals, Federal Circuit, September 10, 1992.” Accessed via<br />
http://digital-law-online.info/cases/24PQ2D1015.htm in June 2011.<br />
15 George Tibbets, “Nintendo Has Strategy to Keep its Lead in Toy Industry,” Associated Press/Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 25, 1989, page C18.<br />
October 18, 2011 3
NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION”<br />
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Nintendo wasn’t the only company to pr<strong>of</strong>it. Several American game studios grew very successful<br />
businesses creating games using the Nintendo model until lawsuits from shut out developers and an<br />
antitrust investigation forced Nintendo to discontinue exclusivity requirements. 16 Nevertheless, the<br />
third-party developer model was established as an extremely pr<strong>of</strong>itable and effective way to sell<br />
games — and consoles.<br />
A Technological Arms Race<br />
Nintendo began to face strong competition from Tokyo-based Sega, which released a 16-bit console<br />
called Genesis in 1989. There was also growing competition from PC games, including new roleplaying<br />
titles such as Ultima, which took advantage <strong>of</strong> rapid advances in semiconductor technology as<br />
well as the huge distributed base <strong>of</strong> PCs running on Micros<strong>of</strong>t Windows. Additional PC technology<br />
enablers included 256-color VGA graphics cards and “Sound Blaster” cards for audio.<br />
Increasingly, games and game consoles began to compete on underlying technological advancements,<br />
enabled by exponential advances in computing technology. Blocky 2D graphics and limited sound<br />
effects had been replaced by slick 3D environments, stereo audio, and even high-quality CGI<br />
“cutscenes” that featured the voices <strong>of</strong> actors recorded in pr<strong>of</strong>essional sound studios.<br />
Even though the modern consoles were roughly the same size as their late-1970s counterparts, the<br />
hardware inside the machines had drastically changed. A video game console was essentially a<br />
computer with a niche purpose: letting users play games. Just like PCs and all other computers, video<br />
game consoles had a central processing unit (CPU), which carried out the various processing<br />
functions necessary to play games, including starting a new game, loading a new level, calculating<br />
scores, processing inputs from the controllers, and displaying the results on the screen. The power <strong>of</strong><br />
early console processors was measured in “bits,” or a binary digit (one or zero). The Atari 2600 had a<br />
4-bit CPU, while the consoles <strong>of</strong> the late 1990s used faster 64-bit CPUs.<br />
Modern consoles had an additional component, as well: graphics processing units (GPU), also known<br />
as graphics accelerators. A GPU was an extra processor that allowed the CPU to <strong>of</strong>fload calculations<br />
and instructions required to render graphics on the screen. With powerful CPUs, GPUs, and sound<br />
cards, consoles could deliver more intense gaming experiences, including more realistic textures,<br />
weapons, backgrounds, characters, and monsters in 3D worlds.<br />
Diversification in the 1990s<br />
As the hardware race heated up, Nintendo and Sega continued developing consoles. A second<br />
Nintendo console, the Super Famicom, or Super NES, was launched in the early 1990s and sold 49<br />
16 L. Gordon Crovitz, “Rule <strong>of</strong> Congress Zaps Mario and Luigi With Killer Lawyers,” The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1990.<br />
October 18, 2011 4
NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION”<br />
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million units globally. 17 Starting in 1989, the company released a series <strong>of</strong> innovative and ultimately<br />
successful handheld gaming products. The Super Game Boy even had an adapter for earlier NES and<br />
Super NES cartridges.<br />
But not all <strong>of</strong> Nintendo’s gaming efforts were successful. In 1995, Nintendo attempted to capitalize<br />
on a craze for early virtual reality technologies. It announced the first 3D graphic video game console,<br />
called Virtual Boy (Exhibit 2). The Virtual Boy used a head-mounted display to give users an illusion<br />
<strong>of</strong> depth in a simple monochrome virtual world. It was an ambitious project, but met with lukewarm<br />
reception in the market. 18<br />
Sega launched its 32-bit Saturn console in 1995, 19 but it did not fare well against the crop <strong>of</strong><br />
graphically superior systems that were entering the market around the same time. 20 In 1996, Nintendo<br />
announced the Nintendo 64, the company’s last home console to use cartridges (Exhibit 3). Later,<br />
Nintendo switched to a MiniDVD-based format for the GameCube. The Nintendo 64 sold about 5.5<br />
million units in Japan and 33 million units worldwide 21 — an impressive feat, but not nearly as<br />
powerful an impact as Sony’s PlayStation.<br />
Sony entered the market on the s<strong>of</strong>tware side with its Famicom game called Captain ED in 1989. 22<br />
Initially, there was strong internal resistance to entering the video game business. Some in the<br />
company assumed that being associated with a toy would ruin the Sony brand. But an insightful Sony<br />
executive, a former engineer named Ken Kutaragi, had another idea. In 1990, Kutaragi proposed that<br />
Nintendo partner with Sony to co-develop a CD-ROM-based console that leveraged Sony’s CD-<br />
pressing technology. Nintendo and Sony started work on the console, but Nintendo later backed out,<br />
fearing it was too risky to work with a potential competitor. Sony started to develop its own CD-<br />
ROM-based console, and in 1994 released the 32-bit PlayStation. Sony engineers managed to<br />
overcome the limitations <strong>of</strong> earlier systems by pricing the PlayStation lower than the previous CD-<br />
ROM-based game consoles like the NEC PC Engine. 23 The PlayStation’s superior system<br />
performance, affordable price, and wide array <strong>of</strong> games were enough to turn the market upside down.<br />
It was the prelude <strong>of</strong> a new era in the console industry. 24<br />
Not all new competitors fared so well. In the mid-1990s, 3DO, an American company, developed a<br />
32-bit console called the 3DO Interactive Multiplayer, and licensed the technology to three<br />
17 “Top 25 Video Game Consoles <strong>of</strong> All Time,” IGN.com. Accessed from http://www.ign.com/top-25-consoles/ in December 2010. Nintendo Co., Ltd.:<br />
Consolidated Sales Transition by Region. Accessed from http://www.nintendo.co.jp/ir/en/library/historical_data/index.html in June 2011.<br />
18 Mike Cameron, “Virtual Boy Is a Virtual Snore,” The Spectator, September 21, 1995, page 11.<br />
19 “Top 25 Video Game Consoles <strong>of</strong> All Time,” IGN.com. Accessed from http://www.ign.com/top-25-consoles/ in December 2010.<br />
20 Ibid.<br />
21 Nintendo Co., Ltd.: Consolidated Sales Transition by Region. Accessed from http://www.nintendo.co.jp/ir/en/library/historical_data/index.html in June 2011.<br />
22 “Captain Ed,” Gamespot GameFAQs. Accessed from http://www.gamefaqs.com/nes/579469-captain-ed in May 2011.<br />
23 “SNES CD-ROM Console Information,” Console Database. Accessed from http://www.consoledatabase.com/consoleinfo/snescdrom/ in May 2011.<br />
24 Lev Grossman, “Ken Kutaragi: Gutenberg <strong>of</strong> Video Games,” Time, September 27, 1993. Accessed from<br />
http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/2004/time100/artists/100kutagari.html in December 2010.<br />
October 18, 2011 5
NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION”<br />
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manufacturers: Panasonic, Goldstar, and Sanyo. It initially received strong reviews, but the $699 price<br />
was too high and there weren’t enough games. The effort failed. 25<br />
Another American company that attempted to follow the licensing route was Apple, which partnered<br />
with Japanese manufacturer Bandai on the Pippin. The Pippin console, which launched in 1996 in<br />
Japan, North America, and Europe, ran on an Apple operating system but was an utter failure. It was<br />
later rated by PC World magazine as one <strong>of</strong> the “worst tech products <strong>of</strong> all time,” owing to its high<br />
price ($600) and limited game selection. The product was withdrawn from the market in 1997. 26<br />
Besides the console wars, several technological trends also shaped PC gaming during the 1990s,<br />
including the introduction <strong>of</strong> faster processors and graphics cards as well as the spread <strong>of</strong> network<br />
connections via the Internet and local-area networks (LAN). First-person shooter titles such as Doom<br />
and Quake could be played over a LAN or Internet connection, and featured sophisticated 3D<br />
graphics. Another genre that began to gain steam was online role-playing games, such as Starcraft<br />
and the continuation <strong>of</strong> the Ultima series from the 1980s. By the late 1990s, sales <strong>of</strong> video games<br />
rivaled movie ticket sales. 27<br />
Market Dynamics<br />
Competitive Trends in the Early 2000s<br />
By the early part <strong>of</strong> the 2000s, video games were firmly entrenched in youth culture. A report<br />
published by the Pew Internet and American Life Project noted that in 2002, 60% <strong>of</strong> U.S. residents<br />
aged six and older played video games and more than 221 million games were sold. 28<br />
Clearly, games were a big business. Nintendo had fared well, outliving all <strong>of</strong> its early console<br />
competitors (Sega’s last console was the Dreamcast, released in 1999 29 ). But, Sony and Micros<strong>of</strong>t,<br />
two relative newcomers, threatened Nintendo’s future in console gaming.<br />
By this time, Sony dominated with its PlayStation 2 (which could play DVDs as well as game titles).<br />
Launched in 2000, it was designed to be backwards-compatible with all games from the original<br />
PlayStation console. 30 This meant it launched with a massive base <strong>of</strong> players, which expanded to 24<br />
25 “Top 25 Video Game Consoles <strong>of</strong> All Time,” IGN.com. Accessed from http://www.ign.com/top-25-consoles/ in December 2010.<br />
26 Dan Tynan, “The 25 Worst Tech Products <strong>of</strong> All Time,” PCWorld, May 26, 2006. Accessed from http://www.pcworld.com/article/125772-<br />
6/the_25_worst_tech_products_<strong>of</strong>_all_time.html#pippin in December 2010.<br />
27 P.J. Huffstutter, “Now Video Games Are as Big as the Movies,” Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1999. Accessed from<br />
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/may/10/news/mn-35703 in June 2011.<br />
28 Steve Jones, “Let the Games Begin: Gaming Technology and College Students,” Pew Internet & American Life Project, July 6, 2003.<br />
29 “Top 25 Video Game Consoles <strong>of</strong> All Time,” IGN.com. Accessed from http://www.ign.com/top-25-consoles/ in December 2010.<br />
30 Richard Stenger and Daniel Sieberg, “PlayStation 2 Makes Its North American Debut,” CNN.com, October 26, 2000. Accessed from<br />
http://edition.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/10/26/ps2.main.story/ in July 2011.<br />
October 18, 2011 6
NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION”<br />
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million within three years as new titles were built for the PlayStation 2’s superior graphics. 31 Sony<br />
was also battling Nintendo in mobile gaming. In 2004 the two companies released new handheld<br />
gaming systems. The Sony PSP was a portable device that had the most advanced graphics available<br />
for a portable gaming device. However, the Nintendo DS took a different approach to gaming,<br />
featuring two screens with more cartoon-like effects and simple game scenarios. While the PSP<br />
attracted attention from hardcore gamers, the DS was a hit with children, thanks to its easy-to-learn<br />
game-play and popular titles such as New Super Mario Bros.<br />
Meanwhile, Micros<strong>of</strong>t was attempting its own aggressive push into gaming. In the 1980s and 1990s,<br />
Micros<strong>of</strong>t’s gaming efforts centered on support for PC game publishers and its own Flight Simulator<br />
franchise. That changed with the launch <strong>of</strong> the original Xbox in 2001. The Xbox went head-to-head<br />
with Sony’s PlayStation 2. Both consoles competed for hard-core gamers on hardware performance<br />
and graphics — popular titles like Madden and Half-Life 2 tried to immerse players in realistic 3D<br />
environments, and depended on heavy-duty processing power and a constant stream <strong>of</strong> new titles to<br />
keep players hooked. In-game scenarios were getting longer and more sophisticated and, like their PC<br />
counterparts, they let players perform a wide range <strong>of</strong> functions using various combinations <strong>of</strong> input<br />
buttons on the controller. The games were clearly aimed at a hard-core audience <strong>of</strong> regular players.<br />
Although Micros<strong>of</strong>t had never disclosed how much it spent developing the Xbox, analysts estimated<br />
it lost $2 billion to establish the console in the market. 32 In terms <strong>of</strong> the two consoles’ installed bases,<br />
Sony had a market share <strong>of</strong> 66% while Micros<strong>of</strong>t had just 22%. 33 Squeezed in-between these two<br />
aggressive competitors, Nintendo had to think through how to fight back.<br />
In 2001, Nintendo released the GameCube console (Exhibit 4). It was housed in a plastic cube about<br />
the size <strong>of</strong> a lunchbox. Inside, it featured an IBM-designed “Gekko” processor and ATI “Flipper”<br />
GPU, and had an optical disc drive. 34 While adequate for basic 3D games and Mario Bros., the<br />
hardware failed to measure up to the PlayStation 2 or the Xbox. Nintendo dismissed the criticism,<br />
saying that the simple design and emphasis on fun-to-play s<strong>of</strong>tware like Metroid Prime and Legend <strong>of</strong><br />
Zelda was an asset, and would help attract new gamers who were turned <strong>of</strong>f by long, complex console<br />
games. Indeed, the GameCube’s s<strong>of</strong>tware, toy-like feel, low-powered hardware, and cheap price<br />
($200 at launch) appealed to families with younger children. However, many serious gamers derided<br />
it for its poor hardware specs and lack <strong>of</strong> compelling s<strong>of</strong>tware. 35 It sold nearly 22 million units<br />
31 Davide Dukcevich, “Monday Matchup: PlayStation 2 Vs. Xbox,” Forbes, December 22, 2003. Accessed via<br />
http://www.forbes.com/2003/12/22/cx_dd_1222mondaymatchup.html in June 2011.<br />
32 David Becker and Joe Wilcox, “Will Xbox Drain Micros<strong>of</strong>t?” CNet News, March 6, 2001. Accessed from http://news.cnet.com/Will-Xbox-drain-<br />
Micros<strong>of</strong>t/2100-1040_3-253654.html in June 2011.<br />
33 Davide Dukcevich, “Monday Matchup: PlayStation 2 Vs. Xbox,” Forbes, December 22, 2003. Accessed via<br />
http://www.forbes.com/2003/12/22/cx_dd_1222mondaymatchup.html in June 2011.<br />
34 “Nintendo’s GameCube Technical Overview,” Dreamcast Technical Pages. Accessed from http://www.segatech.com/gamecube/overview/index.html in June<br />
2011.<br />
35 “Top 25 Video Game Consoles <strong>of</strong> All Time,” IGN.com. Accessed from http://www.ign.com/top-25-consoles/16.html in December 2010.<br />
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worldwide before being discontinued. 36 By comparison, the PlayStation 2 sold an estimated 130<br />
million units. 37<br />
Two-Sided Networks<br />
The video game industry was a classic example <strong>of</strong> a business based on network externalities. The<br />
more consoles that were sold, the more independent gaming studios were incented to develop new<br />
titles. This in turn increased console sales. Console makers could also sell their own titles, a tactic that<br />
had worked very well for Nintendo and its Mario Bros. and Pokémon franchises.<br />
As the video game market was growing, hardware was typically sold at a loss right after launch in<br />
order to build a customer base. Once the customer base was established, s<strong>of</strong>tware could be sold at a<br />
higher price and/or volume to make a pr<strong>of</strong>it. Average console costs dropped over time, as<br />
manufacturing scaled up, component costs declined, and the learning curve kicked in. Sony lost an<br />
estimated $100-$160 per PlayStation 2 when it was first launched, but reportedly made up for the loss<br />
with pr<strong>of</strong>its generated by selling game titles and accessories. 38 Micros<strong>of</strong>t also sold consoles at a loss,<br />
in order to establish a presence in the new industry. 39<br />
But the positive feedback loops required to make a successful console were hard to maintain. 40 First, a<br />
constant stream <strong>of</strong> new game titles was required to preserve the value <strong>of</strong> the console hardware, and<br />
convince gamers not to switch. If a platform failed to preserve a steady stream <strong>of</strong> new titles, negative<br />
feedback loops would kick in as gamers and developers abandoned the platform. Second, game<br />
development had become far more complicated in terms <strong>of</strong> game-play scenarios and technology<br />
requirements. In 1996, a typical PlayStation game cost $1 million to develop and sold for $49. By<br />
2003, PlayStation 2 and Xbox games still cost $49, but development costs had risen to between $5<br />
million and $7 million per game. The high costs meant console companies, major game publishers<br />
and independent studios had to rely on a high degree <strong>of</strong> collaboration. These requirements dissuaded<br />
smaller studios from producing lots <strong>of</strong> titles, which created an additional drag on the network<br />
externalities that powered successful platforms. Third, independent game studios did not want the<br />
console market dominated by only Sony and Micros<strong>of</strong>t, as it reduced their bargaining power in pr<strong>of</strong>itsharing<br />
negotiations. This dynamic was actually a boon to Nintendo — many third-party publishers<br />
wanted to help Nintendo with its next console effort, which served as an additional positive network<br />
effect for Nintendo.<br />
36 Nintendo Co., Ltd.: Consolidated Sales Transition by Region. Accessed from http://www.nintendo.co.jp/ir/en/library/historical_data/index.html in June 2011.<br />
37 “Top 25 Video Game Consoles <strong>of</strong> All Time,” IGN.com. Accessed from http://www.ign.com/top-25-consoles/ in December 2010.<br />
38 “The Game <strong>of</strong> War,” Red Herring, October 14, 2001. Accessed from http://www.redherring.com/Home/2699 in June 2011.<br />
39 David Becker and Joe Wilcox, “Will Xbox Drain Micros<strong>of</strong>t?” CNet News, March 6, 2001. Accessed from http://news.cnet.com/Will-Xbox-drain-<br />
Micros<strong>of</strong>t/2100-1040_3-253654.html in June 2011.<br />
40 Tom L<strong>of</strong>tus, “Top Video Games May Soon Cost More,” MSNBC, June 17, 2003. Accessed from<br />
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078404/ns/technology_and_science-games/ in December 2010.<br />
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Periodic Market Cycle<br />
The video game industry had a five-year hardware cycle. Once a new game console was released,<br />
new game titles would be launched on their own cycles over the five-year period. Many were one-<strong>of</strong>f<br />
titles that were nominally successful or, in some cases, lost money. Others were popular and<br />
generated sequels every two or three years. Some, such as popular sports titles, had new releases or<br />
expansion packs every year.<br />
Since there were a limited number <strong>of</strong> developers or game publishers, early mover advantage existed<br />
for console manufacturers. And once s<strong>of</strong>tware developers devoted resources to building game titles<br />
for one hardware platform, it was difficult for them to switch to another platform owing to different<br />
staffing or technical requirements. Furthermore, once gamers invested in one console, they were less<br />
likely to switch consoles owing to the additional cost. 41 These factors made it difficult for new<br />
hardware manufacturers to enter the market.<br />
By the end <strong>of</strong> 2004, the competition was starting to approach the end <strong>of</strong> their respective five-year<br />
cycles. Sony and Micros<strong>of</strong>t would be launching replacements for the PlayStation 2 and Xbox in time<br />
for the 2005 holiday shopping season. 42 Following this same five-year hardware cycle, Nintendo<br />
would have a new console hitting the market in 2006.<br />
A History <strong>of</strong> Nintendo <strong>Management</strong><br />
The Playing Card Era<br />
Nintendo was established in 1889 by Fusajiro Yamauchi to produce handmade playing cards<br />
decorated with drawings <strong>of</strong> flowers, famous people, and other objects (Exhibit 5). The name <strong>of</strong> the<br />
company, when rendered in the Chinese script used in Japan, meant “luck-heaven-hall.” The<br />
company began selling ‘Hanafuda’ cards in two shops, one located in Osaka and the other in Kyoto,<br />
where Nintendo company headquarters are still located. The cards were a success, and the company<br />
rapidly expanded. It was run by Yamauchi’s extended family for more than 100 years.<br />
At first, the company concentrated on the card business. But in 1959, with a young CEO named<br />
Hiroshi Yamauchi at the helm, Nintendo cut a licensing deal with Disney to have Disney characters<br />
printed on Nintendo’s playing cards, thus giving them a brand new look. 43 In 1963, Yamauchi<br />
shortened the Nintendo Playing Card Company’s name to Nintendo Company Limited, 44 signaling<br />
41 Tom L<strong>of</strong>tus, “Top Video Games May Soon Cost More,” MSNBC, June 17, 2003. Accessed from<br />
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078404/ns/technology_and_science-games/ in December 2010.<br />
42 Ina Fried. “Digging Pr<strong>of</strong>its Out <strong>of</strong> Xbox,” Cnet.com. August 10, 2005. Accessed from http://news.cnet.com/Digging-pr<strong>of</strong>its-out-<strong>of</strong>-Xbox/2100-1043_3-<br />
5827110.html in December 2010.<br />
43 Chris Kohler, “This Day in Tech: Success Is in the Cards for Nintendo,” Wired, September 23, 2010. Accessed from<br />
http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/09/0923nintendo-founded/ in June 2011.<br />
44 “Nintendo History,” Nintendo.co.uk. Accessed from http://www.nintendo.co.uk/NOE/en_GB/service/nintendo_history_9911.html in June 2011.<br />
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that the company would not limit itself to playing cards, and that it would soon enter other business<br />
domains. And so it did.<br />
Surviving as a Toy Company<br />
In the early 1970s, Nintendo ventured into other businesses, including food and toys. One unexpected<br />
success in the late 1970s was Nintendo’s “Ultra Hand,” an extendable robotic arm designed by<br />
Gunpei Yokoi, an assembly line maintenance engineer working at Nintendo. Yamauchi saw that<br />
Yokoi had great ideas and engineering talent, and transferred him to product development where he<br />
came up with innovative products like a baseball throwing machine and a puzzle game. Eventually,<br />
Yokoi oversaw Nintendo’s early video game efforts, including the arcade version <strong>of</strong> Donkey Kong<br />
and the Game Boy. 45<br />
Nintendo <strong>Management</strong> Under Hiroshi Yamauchi<br />
Nintendo’s modern organizational structure was strongly influenced by the management style <strong>of</strong> the<br />
former president and CEO, Hiroshi Yamauchi, who led the company from 1950 to 2002. He was a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the founding family. 46<br />
A charismatic leader with a strong vision <strong>of</strong> what the company could become, Yamauchi drove other<br />
family members from Nintendo’s board soon after he became president and CEO. Nintendo was<br />
originally a family-owned and -managed company but Yamauchi thought it was necessary to change<br />
its culture. 47<br />
Yamauchi was a hands-on leader, apt to make quick decisions according to his vision for the<br />
company. He was always thinking <strong>of</strong> ways in which the company could please its customers, and<br />
welcomed the introduction <strong>of</strong> new ideas, experimentation, novel processes and products — including<br />
food, toys, and, eventually, video games. This attitude extended to other companies in the Nintendo<br />
ecosystem, as one engineer later described: “Nintendo is always trying to do something new and<br />
different. This message has been spread not only within Nintendo, but to other companies as well. As<br />
a result, our development partners have naturally tended to present us with new technologies and<br />
ideas.” 48<br />
Yamauchi established a flat organizational structure at Nintendo. He wanted employees to focus on<br />
customer value, and he believed an organization free from bureaucratic rigidity was best suited to<br />
providing it. Decisions were to be made quickly. Notably, Nintendo under Yamauchi promoted a risktaking<br />
culture, which was unusual for a large Japanese company. Therefore, when Iwata became<br />
45 Lara Crigger, “Searching for Gunpei Yokoi,” The Escapist, December 25, 2007. Accessed from<br />
http://www.escapistmagazine.com/articles/view/issues/issue_129/2744-Searching-for-Gunpei-Yokoi in December 2010.<br />
46 “Nintendo History,” Nintendo.co.uk. Accessed from http://www.nintendo.co.uk/NOE/en_GB/service/nintendo_history_9911.html in June 2011.<br />
47 Takura Kura, “The Success and Failure <strong>of</strong> Nintendo,” Doushisya Business <strong>School</strong>, December 2006.<br />
48 Kou Shiota, Nintendo, “Using State-Of-The-Art Technology in Unprecedented Ways,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from<br />
http://wii.nintendo-europe.com/163.html in December 2010.<br />
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president <strong>of</strong> Nintendo in 2002, the company was prepared to compete in a fast-moving, uncertain, and<br />
competitive environment. 49<br />
Iwata’s Influence<br />
Iwata, an experienced game developer and former president <strong>of</strong> game studio Hal Laboratory, became<br />
president <strong>of</strong> Nintendo in 2002. Even though he was not a member <strong>of</strong> the founding family, Yamauchi<br />
believed Iwata was the right leader to take Nintendo into the new millennium. 50<br />
After becoming CEO, Iwata pushed for several changes in Nintendo’s organizational culture. First, he<br />
asked Nintendo executives to think about what made initiatives succeed or fail. In his mind, the<br />
process was more important than the result. He pressed executives and employees over why certain<br />
business results had occurred. Even if sales were great, executives couldn’t sit back and bask in their<br />
success —Iwata would demand to know the factors that had led to the positive outcome. 51<br />
This emphasis on understanding led to improved communication across departments. The company’s<br />
strategy became better understood among the 1,300 rank-and-file employees, which resulted in more<br />
autonomy across the organization. 52<br />
Coming from outside <strong>of</strong> Nintendo, Iwata made it a rule to talk with staff and persuade them <strong>of</strong> his<br />
vision for the company. This practice created a culture <strong>of</strong> discussion in an organization that had<br />
previously been managed in a top-down way. This culture <strong>of</strong> discussion reinforced coordination<br />
among the company’s s<strong>of</strong>tware and hardware divisions, which had been established during the<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the Nintendo DS. This culture proved beneficial as the Revolution project got<br />
underway. 53<br />
Revolution<br />
While Hiroshi Yamauchi would never have been able to participate in the highly technical<br />
discussions that took place during earlier console development projects in the 1980s and 1990s, Iwata<br />
relished rolling up his sleeves for the Revolution project and diving into the problems with his top<br />
lieutenants and engineers. (See Figure 1 for a description <strong>of</strong> the core product team.) “We<br />
brainstormed with each other from square one,” Iwata recalled. “We were all running into the same<br />
walls, and we made the critical decisions together. I talked with a lot <strong>of</strong> people, such as Takeda-san<br />
and Miyamoto-san, along the way at each juncture.” 54<br />
49 Takura Kura, “The Success and Failure <strong>of</strong> Nintendo,” Doushisya Business <strong>School</strong>, 2006.<br />
50 “The Stars <strong>of</strong> Asia: Satoru Iwata,” BusinessWeek, July 8, 2002. Accessed from http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_27/b3790605.htm in June<br />
2011.<br />
51 Kouji Sasaki, “Interview with Satoru Iwata,” Nikkei Business, November 27, 2006.<br />
52 “Turning the Tables: Asking Iwata,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com. Accessed from http://wii.nintendo-europe.com/165.html in December 2010.<br />
53 Kouji Sasaki, “Interview with Satoru Iwata,” Nikkei Business, November 27, 2006.<br />
54 “Turning the Tables: Asking Iwata,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendo-europe.com/165.html in December 2010.<br />
October 18, 2011 11
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Figure 1 Revolution Core Product Team<br />
Genyo Takeda General Manager, Integrated Research and Development Division<br />
Shigeru Miyamoto General Manager, Entertainment Analysis and Development Division.<br />
Miyamoto was a legend in the industry for his s<strong>of</strong>tware development work and<br />
design for games such as Donkey Kong and early NES titles such as Super<br />
Mario Bros. He had also worked on titles for the GameCube, including Legend<br />
<strong>of</strong> Zelda.<br />
Kou Shiota Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development<br />
Department, Development Group No. 2. Shiota’s specialty was semiconductor<br />
design. He, too, had worked on the GameCube.<br />
Kenichiro Ashida Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development<br />
Department, Design Group. Ashida was a long-time Nintendo employee who<br />
had worked on the Super NES, Nintendo 64, and GameCube, and for the<br />
Revolution was responsible for the design <strong>of</strong> the console, controller, packaging,<br />
and logos.<br />
Akio Ikeda Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development<br />
Department, Development Group No. 5. Ikeda had developed several games in<br />
the past that had used accelerometers and innovative interfaces.<br />
Junji Takamoto Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development<br />
Department, Development Group No. 3. Takamoto was responsible for all<br />
hardware parts on the Revolution with the exception <strong>of</strong> the circuit board.<br />
As planning began on Nintendo’s next-generation gaming console in the months following the release<br />
<strong>of</strong> the GameCube, the team began to think about the core concepts that would underlie the project.<br />
Takeda described the typical development process for a new console:<br />
As soon as we complete one system, we start thinking about the next one. Needless to say we<br />
don’t design new components or technologies from scratch. Rather, we have to base our designs<br />
on existing technologies. In the world <strong>of</strong> technology, there are so-called Roadmaps (overviews <strong>of</strong><br />
proposed technologies/products) that are used by each industry in order to make general forecasts<br />
about where semiconductor technology is heading, as well as the evolution <strong>of</strong> disc and wireless<br />
technologies. Engineers and developers normally refer to these Roadmaps while developing<br />
hardware. 55<br />
However, some Nintendo executives and engineers had begun to question the importance <strong>of</strong><br />
traditional hardware preferences, such as faster processors, slick graphics, and sophisticated<br />
55 “Using State-Of-The-Art Technology in Unprecedented Ways,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendo-<br />
europe.com/455.html in December 2010.<br />
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controllers. Even before the Revolution project, Miyamoto worked on a game called Animal Forest,<br />
which was launched for the Nintendo 64 console in 2001. He deliberately designed it to be easy to<br />
play and appeal to a wide range <strong>of</strong> people. Takeda had also considered non-traditional gamers in his<br />
earlier work on the GameCube, which had a controller with an extra large “A” button for<br />
inexperienced gamers. In 2003, Takeda proposed that the Revolution project should depart from the<br />
technological roadmap, believing that the performance arms race, which drove Sony and Micros<strong>of</strong>t’s<br />
console efforts, was ultimately futile for Nintendo:<br />
After speaking with Nintendo’s development partners, I became keenly aware <strong>of</strong> the fact that<br />
there is no end to the desire <strong>of</strong> those who just want more. Give them one, they ask for two. Give<br />
them two, and next time they will ask for five instead <strong>of</strong> three. Then they want ten, thirty, a<br />
hundred, their desire growing exponentially. Giving in to this will lead us nowhere in the end. I<br />
started to feel unsure about following that path about a year into development. 56<br />
Iwata and the team began to discuss how best to approach the challenge <strong>of</strong> developing a console that<br />
would increase the population <strong>of</strong> gamers beyond its traditional customer base. Certain elements from<br />
the GameCube, including the CPU and GPU, could be upgraded for the Revolution, but other<br />
elements would have to be completely redesigned, based on new product concepts. By 2003, the team<br />
had identified several basic concepts for the console:<br />
• The Revolution was not just a toy for children. The console had to be familiar enough to be<br />
played by all family members, right in the living room.<br />
• It had to be designed in a way that it would be acceptable to mothers, as they have control<br />
over the living room in most households. This meant a small, polished design.<br />
• The console should be inexpensive compared to rival products – namely, Sony PlayStation<br />
and Micros<strong>of</strong>t’s Xbox. Ideally, the price should be less than 10,000 yen (about $100).<br />
• S<strong>of</strong>tware should be easy enough to play so that every family member can play, even for a<br />
short time.<br />
• The console would need to stay on for 24 hours, consume little electricity, and make little<br />
sound. 57<br />
There were other requirements, as well. Besides appealing to mothers, Nintendo had to entice<br />
partners, particularly developers. Further, the Revolution had to be backwards compatible with older<br />
GameCube games and even games from earlier Nintendo consoles, such as the Nintendo 64. This<br />
56 “Using State-Of-The-Art Technology in Unprecedented Ways,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendo-<br />
europe.com/455.html in December 2010.<br />
57 Ibid; “Wii Remote: Taking Control Back To The Drawing Board,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendoeurope.com/164.html<br />
in December 2010; “The Big Ideas Behind Nintendo’s Wii,” BusinessWeek, November 16, 2006. Accessed from<br />
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2006/tc20061116_750580.htm in November 2010.<br />
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would help the Revolution launch with a back catalog, and would also appeal to loyal Nintendo<br />
customers who had invested in GameCube games. 58<br />
This new approach to console design was extended to the controller. Designer Kenichiro Ashida<br />
explained the evolution <strong>of</strong> his thinking about the controller:<br />
I felt strongly that this would be a console that I, too, could enjoy. More specifically, I felt that it<br />
might be time to reconsider the entire game-play style <strong>of</strong> grasping the controller with two hands,<br />
sitting glued to the TV until morning. Of course, I’m not rejecting that intense style <strong>of</strong> play, but I<br />
did feel that taking the whole idea <strong>of</strong> grasping the controller with two hands back to the drawing<br />
board <strong>of</strong>fered a glimpse <strong>of</strong> the future. 59<br />
The rest <strong>of</strong> the design team, right up to the CEO, was supportive <strong>of</strong> the new approach. Iwata, as<br />
someone who had started developing computer games on a programmable calculator when he was a<br />
teenager, appreciated evolutionary steps in game-play and hardware design, and encouraged the team<br />
to think creatively. However, there were limits to how far the team would go, as Miyamoto noted:<br />
This was good in the sense that it allowed us to consider ideas such as not using hands at all, or<br />
even putting the controller on your head. Of course, going too far in that direction would just lead<br />
to something that is different just for the sake <strong>of</strong> being different. An eccentric design like that<br />
might work well for some games, but could never be used as a standard, making it a difficult<br />
choice for a console’s primary controller. So we wanted to come up with a bold and daring design<br />
that would be within the bounds <strong>of</strong> reason. 60<br />
Takeda formed a special controller development team. He believed that the controller was not just a<br />
console peripheral, but also an intermediary between man and machine, and even an extension <strong>of</strong> the<br />
human body. As the controller would be the most frequently used part <strong>of</strong> the console, the controller<br />
development team aimed to create a simple and comfortable controller, which everyone would like to<br />
touch. 61<br />
The team created a series <strong>of</strong> prototypes. Early designs were molded out <strong>of</strong> clay or Styr<strong>of</strong>oam. The<br />
more promising designs were turned into plastic prototypes with working buttons. One prototype had<br />
a touch panel like the Nintendo DS. Another featured a mouse-like pointing device. There was also a<br />
track pad, and even a hat-like controller that allowed gamers to play without using their hands. The<br />
team constantly experimented with the designs, but decided a pointer-based controller was the best<br />
way to go.<br />
58 “Wii Remote: Taking Control Back To The Drawing Board,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendo-<br />
europe.com/164.html in December 2010.<br />
59 Ibid.<br />
60 Ibid.<br />
61 Kouji Sasaki, “Interview with Satoru Iwata,” Nikkei Business, November 27, 2006.<br />
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But within the team, there were debates about what the controller should look like. 62 Console gaming<br />
had been based on a two-handed experience since the first joysticks were developed in the 1970s. One<br />
pointer-based design was a two-handed controller with a pointer in the middle. This prototype was<br />
named “Gunbai,” after the referee’s fan in Japanese Sumo wrestling. However, Miyamoto was<br />
interested in a one-handed device — perhaps something that resembled a familiar device like a<br />
mobile phone — that was easy to use and not intimidating to new gamers. Iwata seized upon the idea<br />
<strong>of</strong> something that looked like a TV remote control. Eventually, Ashida and his staff drew up a rodshaped<br />
pointer, and a demonstration unit was prepared. 63<br />
Decision Point<br />
Iwata eagerly entered the conference room and looked at the new rod-shaped device on the table. He<br />
had tried pointer-based prototypes before, but this single-handed design appealed to him: “From the<br />
moment I picked it up, it just felt right. I had handled other pointer devices before, but they are not<br />
normally responsive and leave you feeling more frustrated than relaxed. The pointer idea itself was<br />
also good, but in this case it was the sense <strong>of</strong> control, the finish <strong>of</strong> the product, that was particularly<br />
good.” 64<br />
But some members <strong>of</strong> the team had reservations. Ashida reminded the group <strong>of</strong> the need for the<br />
Revolution to be able to play GameCube games as well as popular titles dating from Nintendo’s NES<br />
from the 1980s. Most <strong>of</strong> these games required two-handed play. On top <strong>of</strong> that, they also had to<br />
consider the traditional gamer audience. Despite all <strong>of</strong> the attention on the “mom” crowd and other<br />
new audience segments, Nintendo needed to convince serious gamers to give the Revolution a<br />
chance. The team knew that overseas gamers preferred first-person shooters and other action titles<br />
that worked well with two-handed controllers. 65<br />
In addition, Ashida pointed to game developers, who had their own ideas about innovation: “There<br />
were also requests from the development teams for Metroid and other s<strong>of</strong>tware titles asking for a new<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> controller that uses both hands, that can <strong>of</strong>fer a new type <strong>of</strong> game-play.” 66<br />
Iwata knew that the team was taking a big gamble with a new controller design. While they had<br />
brainstormed and experimented extensively, the company refused to bring in focus groups to test out<br />
the designs, partially out <strong>of</strong> fear <strong>of</strong> leaks. As a result <strong>of</strong> this decision, the company would only know<br />
user reaction after the Revolution’s launch.<br />
62 “Wii Remote: Taking Control Back To The Drawing Board,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendo-<br />
europe.com/164.html in December 2010.<br />
63 Ibid.<br />
64 Ibid.<br />
65 Ibid.<br />
66 Ibid.<br />
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Besides user reaction, there was also the question <strong>of</strong> how the proposed one-handed rod could be used<br />
with older Nintendo console games that had been designed for two-handed controllers. Backwardscompatibility<br />
with the older games was required, to give an incentive for the existing customers who<br />
owned them to upgrade to the new console. How could the Revolution’s rod controller be modified<br />
for two-handed action?<br />
Iwata and his team had little time. At the 2005 E3 gaming exposition in Los Angeles, Nintendo<br />
planned to announce the Revolution, and maybe even demonstrate the console and controller.<br />
Industry buzz was pointing to both Micros<strong>of</strong>t and Sony announcing their own next-generation<br />
consoles at E3. Would Nintendo be able to deliver?<br />
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Exhibit 1 Nintendo Famicom/NES<br />
Source: Jennifer Boriss/DoNotLick, http://www.flickr.com/photos/donotlick/4352297340/.<br />
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Exhibit 2 Nintendo Virtual Boy<br />
Source: kafka4prez, http://www.flickr.com/photos/kafka4prez/59373076/sizes/m/in/photostream/.<br />
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Exhibit 3 Nintendo 64<br />
Source: Ciro Duran/cir<strong>of</strong>ono, http://www.flickr.com/photos/ciroduran/3109883260/.<br />
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Exhibit 4 Nintendo GameCube*<br />
*GameCube accessories include bongo drums, used for titles such as Donkey Kong Jungle Beat.<br />
Source: freespamfree, http://www.flickr.com/photos/7524204@N07/1767205224/.<br />
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Exhibit 5 Hanafuda 48 Cards<br />
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NintendoCards.jpg, accessed December 2010.<br />
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Appendix 1 Most Popular Game Types (% <strong>of</strong> games sold in U.S., 2004)<br />
Genre Console games PC games<br />
Action 30% 4%<br />
Sports 18% 5%<br />
Shooter 10% 16%<br />
Children & family entertainment 10% 20%<br />
Racing 9% N/A<br />
RPG 9% 10%<br />
Fighting 5% N/A<br />
Strategy N/A 27%<br />
Adventure N/A 6%<br />
Source: NPD Group. , cited in “Computer and Video Game S<strong>of</strong>tware Sales Reach Record $7.3 Billion in 2004; Final U.S. Sales<br />
Data Indicates 8 Games Sold Every Second <strong>of</strong> 2004,” Business Wire, January 27, 2005.<br />
Appendix 2 Top-selling U.S. Console and Portable Games, 2004<br />
Name Console Units (million)<br />
1 Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas PS2 5.1<br />
2 Halo 2 Xbox 4.2<br />
3 Madden NFL 2005 PS2 3.2<br />
4 ESPN NFL 2K5 PS2 1.5<br />
5 Need for Speed Underground 2 PS2 1.4<br />
6 Pokémon FireRed (with adapter) GameBoy 1.2<br />
7 NBA Live 2005 PS2 1.2<br />
8 Spider-Man 2 PS2 1.1<br />
9 Halo: Combat Evolved Xbox 1.1<br />
10 ESPN NFL 2K5 Xbox 1<br />
Source: “NPD: $9.9 billion worth <strong>of</strong> console games sold in 2004.” GameSpot, January 18, 2005. Accessed from<br />
http://www.gamespot.com/xbox/action/halo/news/6116499/npd-99-billion-worth-<strong>of</strong>-console-games-sold-in-2004 in August 2011.<br />
October 18, 2011 22
NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION”<br />
Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka<br />
Appendix 3 Production and Sales Information, FY 2004<br />
Production 2003 2004<br />
Electronic entertainment products<br />
(Hardware)<br />
Handheld 128,902 200,502<br />
Console 171,730 14,368<br />
Others 39,156 24,835<br />
Subtotal 339,789 239,707<br />
(S<strong>of</strong>tware)<br />
Handheld 129,830 119,746<br />
Console 107,204 94,727<br />
Subtotal 237,034 214,474<br />
Other Products 704 1,506<br />
Total 577,528 455,687<br />
Sales<br />
Electronic entertainment products<br />
(Hardware)<br />
Handheld 132,246 185,175<br />
Console 101,554 54,366<br />
Others 41,453 49,679<br />
Subtotal 275,254 289,220<br />
(S<strong>of</strong>tware)<br />
Handheld 123,369 132,911<br />
Console 99,325 86,262<br />
Royalty income and contents income 3,978 3,015<br />
Other 476 881<br />
Subtotal 227,149 223,070<br />
Other Products 1,730 2,513<br />
Total 504,135 514,805<br />
Source: Nintendo Co. Ltd., Consolidated Financial Statements, May 27, 2004.<br />
October 18, 2011 23